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The Taegeukgi and the Maple Leaf:              
The Pursuit of South Korean Export Markets        
by Atomic Energy Canada Limited 
Ian J. Slater 
York University 
Abstract: In the 1980’s Canada’s nuclear technology company, Atomic Energy 
Canada Limited (AECL), designed and attempted to sell a next-generation, small-
scale nuclear reactor called the Slowpoke Energy System (SES). AECL pursued 
export markets for the SES, of which the most promising was South Korea. The 
SES project was forced to compete for funding and this necessitated the 
formation of partnerships with private and public sector agents in South Korea. 
AECL’s experience in South Korea suggests that crown corporations are more 
commercially oriented than established policy scholarship admits, and that in 
some cases competitive forces work to blunt innovation rather than reward it. 
Résumé : Dans les années 1980, la société canadienne de technologie nucléaire, 
Énergie atomique du Canada limitée (EACL), conçoit et tente de mettre en 
marché une nouvelle génération de réacteur nucléaire de petite dimension appelée 
Slowpoke Energy System (SES). EACL cherche des marchés où exporter le SES, 
et entrevoit des avenues prometteuses en Corée du Sud. Le projet SES doit 
toutefois compétitionner pour le financement, ce qui nécessite la formation de 
partenariats avec des agents des secteurs privés et publics de la Corée du Sud. 
L’expérience d’EACL en Corée du Sud suggère que les sociétés de la couronne 
sont plus orientées vers le commerce que ne l’admet généralement la recherche 
académique sur les politiques d’État, et que dans certains cas, les forces de la 
compétition contribuent davantage à émousser l’innovation plutôt qu’à la 
récompenser. 
 Canada, in common with other jurisdictions, is undergoing a “nuclear 
renaissance.” Rising concerns about environmental issues as well as the 
need for affordable energy have pushed policymakers in industrialized 
nations to reconsider the role of nuclear power. For the first time since the 
cautionary events surrounding Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the 
commercial prospects for nuclear power are improving. Atomic Energy 
Canada Limited (AECL) is keen to find export markets for its CANDU 
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reactor and stands to benefit from this change in circumstances.1 In 
addition, AECL is committed to the pursuit of next-generation nuclear 
designs, partly to increase efficiencies, but also to address design 
complications that have led to expensive re-tubing of its CANDU fleet.2 A 
desire to increase the influence of the market on the industry accompanies 
Canada’s nuclear renaissance, with calls for partnerships with the private 
sector and even privatization.3 
AECL has attempted next-generation nuclear designs in the past. In the 
early 1980’s the company attempted to market a next-generation, small-
scale “inherently safe” nuclear reactor called the Slowpoke Energy System 
or SES. The SES was intended for both the domestic and international 
market, but the lack of sales prospects in Canada meant that the latter was 
the only feasible option. Export markets were pursued in Romania, the 
former Czech Republic, the United States, China, and Hungary, although 
the most promising market was South Korea, the focus of this paper.4 
South Korea imported a significant amount of foreign oil, and this, 
combined with environmental concerns, led to a strong interest in nuclear 
power. In addition, South Korea had purchased a CANDU reactor 
(Wolsong I) in 1983 and thus had the requisite infrastructure and skill 
base to support further nuclear development.  
This account of AECL’s attempt to break into the South Korean market 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s serves as a cautionary tale for those who see the 
                                                      
1. AECL is also interested in the domestic market, but it remains the case that domestic 
sales are limited and international sales represent the largest market for its products. For 
more on the importance of export markets to AECL, see Duane Bratt, The Politics of 
CANDU Exports (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) and G. Bruce Doern, 
Robert W. Morrison and Arslan Dorman, Canadian Nuclear Energy Policy: Changing 
Ideas, Institutions, and Interests (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). 
2. See “Pickering Reactor Back On-Line After Eight Years,” The Globe and Mail, 
28 September 2005, A.13. 
3. Eric Reguly, “How Do You Price AECL If You Don't Know Its Value?” The Globe 
and Mail, 17  November 2006, B.1. 
4. See for example, AECL archives, newc15-161\1420-3-5v2b, memo from Snell to A. 
R. Bancroft, Barclay, Campbell, McDougall and Ohta, 31 July 1991; AECL archives, 
newc15-161\1420-3-5v2b, memo from Snell to LES Team, 31 July 1991; AECL archives, 
c11-les4\hyundai2.max, memo from A.S. Bain to Bancroft, 12 October 1984; AECL 
archives, c11-les4\costs.max, meeting between AECL and Hyundai, 27 September 1984; 
AECL archives, C17-166\1420-10files\1420-10v8b, memo from Ian Glen to Lynch, 31 
January 1989;  AECL archives, C17-166\1420-10files\1420-10v8c, letter from Ian Glen to 
T.C. Edwards, 23 February 1989; AECL archives, C17-166\1420-7files\1420-7v2c, 
Program Manager’s Report, 1 January 1987; AECL archives, C7-165\1420-4-2v1, extract 
from Report on Operations, 31 December 1981; AECL archives, C7-165\ 1420-4-2v1, 
letter from A.G. MacDonald, ECS Systems to J.E. Whelan, Boeing, 22 January 1982; 
AECL archives, C16157\1420-1V7, memo from Bancroft to Critoph, Green, Hart, Lennox 
and Robertson, 7 March 1984; AECL archives, C5-158\1420-1v10, memo From Hancox 
to A.F. Scott, 7 November 1984; AECL archives, C1-1205\5004-3v1, letter from Lennox 
to Major N.J. Dorff, DBM, National Defence, 2 October 1981. 
The Taegeukgi and the Maple Leaf 49 
future of the nuclear industry resting on international adoption of next-
generation nuclear designs in a market driven environment. The case of 
the South Korean SES sale also reveals that commercial priorities had 
come to dominate AECL by the 1980’s, contrary to the company’s image 
as a primarily R&D organization. The SES case thus creates difficulties 
for the standard economic view of crown corporations, and state-owned 
enterprises in general, as organizations focused primarily on so-called 
“social welfare goals.” This account follows AECL’s interpretation of 
events, to better understand how personnel at state-owned enterprises 
conceptualize and operate in a competitive, market driven environment. 
Using Duane Bratt’s analysis of AECL’s export policy as a guide, it 
suggests that the South Korean SES sale is another example of the impact 
of commercialization pressures and neo-liberal market thinking on 
technological innovation by the state.5 
The Slowpoke Energy System: History and Design 
AECL considered small-scale nuclear reactor designs as early as 1952. 
Due to inefficiencies associated with low megawatt reactors, early designs 
favoured heat over electricity production.6 Despite considerable technical 
support for a smaller-scale design, the concept was set aside as it was felt 
that nuclear was only competitive with coal and hydro power at larger 
sizes.7 The small scale reactor concept was reconsidered in 1963 when 
Toronto City Hall was designated as a possible site for a nuclear heating 
reactor, but was subsequently rejected.8 
                                                      
5. This account of AECL’s South Korean initiative is based on interviews with AECL 
personnel and material shipped from the AECL archives in Chalk River to AECL Sheridan 
Park in Mississauga in 2001 and 2002 (I have followed AECL’s naming conventions for 
all archival materials). These materials consisted of reports, correspondence (letters and 
faxes), memos, meeting minutes and external program reviews. Corresponding materials 
from the Korean side have not been used, as the primary focus of this research has been to 
reconstruct AECL’s actions in order to evaluate the commercial dimension of the Crown 
Corporation’s activities. 
6. AECL archives, C1-1205\5005-1v1, letter from Ian MacKay, head, plant design branch, 
Canadian General Electric, to W.B. Lewis and G.C. Laurence, CRNL, 19 August 1952.  
7. AECL archives, C1-1205\5005-1v1, letter from J.L. Grey, Vice President, to L.G. 
Williams, project engineer, Marathon Corporation of Canada, 26 September 1957; AECL 
archives, C1-1205\5005-1v1, letter from E.W. Bowness to D.D. Stewart, 17 October 1957; 
AECL archives, C1-1205\5005-1v1, letter from Stewart, general superintendant reactor 
operations CRNL, to E.W. Bowness, 29 October 1957; AECL archives, C1-1205\5005-
1v2, memo from F.M. Sayers to Lewis, 28 January 1959. It is interesting to note here, in 
contrast with AECL’s image as company primarily concerned with R&D, competitiveness 
trumps design from the beginning. 
8. The existing City Hall system had two 18MW alternating electro boilers at a total 
capital and operating cost of about $450,000 in 1961. AECL estimated that a replacement 
nuclear facility would cost approximately $250,000 Canadian. See AECL archives, 
C16157\1420-1v1, memo from H.B. Merlin to G.A. Pon, 28 October 1963. 
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Another possibility that was considered in the early years was placing 
reactors in remote northern communities where the high cost of fuel 
transport would counterbalance the cost of training and hiring reactor 
operators.9 A 1960 study done by Canadian Westinghouse investigated the 
possibility of constructing a small (40MW) thermal pressurized boiling 
light water reactor to be used in the Arctic.10 This Westinghouse study 
produced cost estimates of 292 cents per million BTU, with a capital 
outlay of approximately $3.5 million, as opposed to a traditional oil fired 
system at 195 cents per million BTU. The proposal was not pursued. 
The early call for small scale nuclear power ultimately foundered on 
competition with existing forms of power production. As one AECL 
engineer put it in 1963, 
Even when an optimistic approach in favour of the nuclear system is taken it is 
found that as heat sources nuclear reactors having outputs of 50MW thermal or 
less cannot compete with conventional oil-fired heat sources.11 
Note that the technical case for small-scale nuclear power was not 
contested. Although designing an efficient small scale nuclear reactor was 
a challenging task, early decisions to set aside small scale nuclear were 
made primarily on economic grounds.  
The business case changed significantly in the late 1970’s, thanks to the 
oil crisis. Concerns over the rising price of foreign oil and its politically 
volatile nature, encouraged the Canadian federal government to take 
action. It introduced the National Energy Program (NEP), a policy 
package designed to encourage alternative energy technologies and reduce 
dependence on oil. According to Desveaux, Canada took a “structured and 
strongly interventionist” response to the oil crisis, and this response was 
keenly felt in the nuclear industry.12 
With secure natural reserves of Canadian uranium, nuclear was a good 
fit for NEP funding. NEP programs also favoured smaller scale 
technologies like the SES, for example, the Remote Community 
Development Program encouraged small Northern settlements to tap into 
a 24 million dollar fund in order to, “assess energy needs and alternatives 
to expensive off-grid non-renewable fossil fuel.”13 153 million was made 
                                                      
9. AECL archives, C16157\1420-1v1, letter from L.R. Haywood, Vice President 
Engineering, to M.A. Smith, Toronto, Hydro Electric Power Commission, 4 November 1963. 
10. AECL archives, AECL-1045 (also listed as CWAED Report 37), Canadian 
Westinghouse, “Small Reactors for Northern Canada,” 1960.  
11. AECL archives, C16157\1420-1v1, letter from Haywood to Smith, Hydro Electric 
Power Commission, 4 November 1963. 
12. James Desveaux, Designing Bureaucracies: Institutional Capacity and Large-Scale 
Problem Solving (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 25. 
13. The Remote Community Development Program encompassed over 325 off-grid 
northern communities. Providing heat and electricity for these communities took 
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available for the Canadian Oil Substitution Program, another initiative to 
replace oil with less sensitive resources.14 
The NEP was a multi-departmental initiative, leading to some odd 
pairings. For example, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation 
(CMHC) targeted Elliot Lake as a possible location for a small-scale 
nuclear heating reactor, to be owned and operated by Rio Algom. The 
plan was to use the reactor for heating and substance analysis.15 This was 
probably the first time the CMHC made policy recommendations with a 
nuclear component. AECL identified approximately 80 communities, 23 
Department of National Defense sites and several mines as sufficiently 
large to use a SES reactor, while at the same time qualifying for funding 
under one or more NEP programs. 
The SES was born in this promising funding climate. Several design 
variants of the reactor were suggested, from an organic cooled design to a 
heating reactor to an electricity producing reactor (fig. 1). AECL ultimately 
focused on two main design variants, an electricity producing design and a 
heating design, with the latter being the primary focus for sales efforts.16 
The SES thermal reactor design is a “pool-style” facility, moderated and 
cooled by light water. To avoid the need for high-pressure steam, the SES 
heats water to 85 degrees Celsius. This water circulates by natural 
convection, passing heat exchangers that transfer the heat to a hot-water 
distribution system that heats the facility.17 In principle, the SES can be 
connected to any existing hot water system. Natural convection obviates 
the need for pumps, thus simplifying the design. The reactor was designed 
for 10MW(t-thermal) operation, about enough to heat a large university.18 
                                                                                                                         
approximately 2.5 million barrels of oil a year, at a cost up to 200% more than grid power. 
The Program was administered by the Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development, and Energy Mines and Resources, as part of the “Energy Policy for North of 
60,” a program that was part of the NEP. AECL archives, C16157\1420-1v3, EMR 
Communique, Remote Community Demonstration Program, 17 June 1982. 
14. Ibid. For more on the viability of the Canadian Oil Substitution Program as a source of 
funding for the SES, see Ian J. Slater, “Atomic Energy Canada Limited and Next 
Generation Nuclear Reactors,” ICON: The Journal of the International Committee on the 
History of Technology 11 (2005): 120-181. 
15. AECL archives, C16157, 1420-1v2, memo from D.J.R. Evans to A.B. Lillie–Visit of 
Peter Favot, Director of R&D, CMHC, and Peter Russel, CMHC, 20 June 1979. 
16. AECL archives, C17-166\1420-10files\1420-10v4a, letter to Rovac from Business 
Unit, 24 June 1987. 
17. Reactor parameters changed throughout the development of the product, the 
information given here represents a summary from various primary sources. See for 
example, AECL archives, z-oldimages\tempdoc1, letter from Hancock to Donnelly, 1 Jan. 
1984; AECL archives, z-oldimages/Spexecsumm, Executive Project Summary, 1 October 
1987; AECL archives, C12-LES2\folder9b, commercial specifications, 30 July 1990.  
18. AECL archives, 1420-1/Slowpoke Overall, 10 January 1986. 
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Figure 1.   Small Reactors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AECL archives, ID: CRNL 2638, © Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1981. 
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 The SES design minimized core size by maximizing reactivity through 
the use of a uranium core surrounded by a beryllium reflector. AECL 
referred to the SES design as “passively” or “inherently” safe, as it had 
“no reliance on engineered safeguards.”19 In practice, passive or inherent 
safety was achieved through the use of: 
1. A cooling pool that worked by natural convection (no pumps to fail) and was 
capable of diffusing the maximum heat the reactor could provide.  
2. The use of CANDU-type fuel, with a high melting point, low operating 
temperatures, negative temperature reactivity coefficient (as temperature 
increased reactivity of fuel decreased) and negative coolant temperature 
reactivity coefficient (as temperature increased reactivity of coolant decreased). 
3. Low reactivity addition rates and low fuel enrichment. 
4. Lack of pressurization, making an explosive loss of coolant accident impossible 
The small size of the reactor made it ideal for urban installations and 
remote community installations (fig. 2). In an industry that relies heavily 
on engineered safeguards and large scale to achieve economies of scale, 
the SES embodied the principle that “small is beautiful.”  AECL’s design 
and marketing of a small scale nuclear reactor in the 1980’s provides a 
glimpse into the fate of next-generation reactors, one well worth 
considering in today’s political and economic climate. 
The SES in South Korea 
South Korea was a top candidate for an SES export sale in the 1980s. The 
country had an expanding economy, a strong commitment to nuclear power, 
a desire to reduce pollution, and an existing relationship with AECL 
through the Wolsong-1 CANDU reactor.  Despite these advantages, there 
were stumbling blocks to nuclear development in South Korea. Increasing 
anti-nuclear sentiment, a new phenomenon in South Korea at the time, 
contributed to licensing problems and unexpected costs. AECL also faced 
rival bids from American, Soviet and European competitors. 
In addition, the SES was designed around certain “core parameters,”20 
one of them being simplicity of design for greater safety. Simplicity 
meant that the reactor could be copied, and in fact the SLOWPOKE 
Research Reactor, a design precursor to the SES, had been copied. After 
                                                      
19. AECL archives, z-oldimages/sesoverview, P.C. Ernst, Synopsis of Executive 
Management Technical Review of the 10MW SLOWPOKE Energy System (SES-10), 14 
August 1990, p. 5. In the end, the SES relied on both passive and engineered safety 
systems, due in large part to the decision of the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) to 
regulate the SES like a CANDU. For more on this, see Slater, “Atomic Energy Canada 
Limited and Next Generation Nuclear Reactors.” 
20. See AECL archives, G.F. Lynch, Local Energy Systems Business Strategy, Internal 
Report (1988), p. 1.  
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several years of sending graduate students to Canada to learn nuclear 
physics, Chinese scientists created the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor 
(MNSR), a direct copy of the SLOWPOKE.21 AECL was concerned that 
this could happen again and had to weigh the value of sales against the 
possibility that the South Koreans could reverse-engineer the reactor.  
Figure 2.   2MW Slowpoke-3 Heating Reactor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AECL archives, ID: CRNL 3694-h, © Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1983. 
Nuclear reactors produced approximately 40% of the power in South 
Korea in the early 1980’s (Canada’s level was approximately 12% at that 
time), reflecting the country’s commitment to the technology, and in the 
beginning at least, little or no public concern was voiced about nuclear 
power. As CANDU had a presence in the country, AECL not only had 
technical facilities available to it, but also contacts at important firms, 
                                                      
21. The MNSR was an exact copy, right down to the colour of the control panel. For more 
on this, see Ian J. Slater, “The Bungling Giant: Atomic Energy Canada Limited and Next-
Generation Nuclear Technology, 1980-1994,” (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2003), 
55-61.   
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staff who were familiar with the South Korean market, and a large group 
of South Korean politicians and civil servants with whom it had done 
business. Pollution was an increasing problem, and the South Korean 
government had a mandate to pursue options that would reduce emissions. 
This included a government company (the Korea District Heating 
Corporation–KDHC) dedicated to the development of local or district 
heating systems for some of the most populated and remote parts of the 
country. 
The Economics of the South Korean Market 
As of December of 1985, over 40 million South Koreans occupied a 
landmass the size of the island of Newfoundland, with a GNP of 
approximately $80 billion (US).  The country’s exports took advantage of 
a cheap labor force, giving it a competitive advantage in labor-intensive 
industries,22 but a disadvantage in skill-intensive high-technology 
industries, where international partnerships were gaining prominence. In 
the early 1980’s the government’s “fifth five year development plan” 
emphasized low unemployment and low interest rates for stability rather 
than growth. By the mid-1980’s, the sixth five year development plan was 
being debated in the national assembly, and it focused on social welfare 
issues, rural development, and the expansion of the economy into high-
tech and technology intensive areas. The US was South Korea’s largest 
trading partner, followed by Japan, Hong Kong, Germany and Canada.23 
South Korea was an oil and natural gas importer, taking in over $5.7 
billion (US) worth of crude oil in 1984. One way to reduce both its trade 
deficit and problems with fossil fuel pollution was to substitute nuclear 
power for fossil fuel. South Korea participated in a number of trade 
agreements with Canada, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the General Preferential Tariff (GPT) agreement, and the 
Canada/Korea trade agreement, and both countries assigned the other 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. Canada exported approximately $770 
million worth of goods to South Korea in 1984, mainly raw materials 
(coal the most prominent), wheat, telecommunications equipment and 
some small manufactured goods.  South Korea exported approximately 
$1.2 billion in goods to Canada in the same year, mainly cars, textiles, 
clothing and small electronics.24 
                                                      
22. In order of export magnitude: textiles, ships, iron and steel, electronics, footwear, 
livestock, food & consumer goods, raw materials and fuel, machinery. 
23. AECL archives, newc19-162\1420-3-7v2a, memo from R.D. Gadsby, CANDU Ops, to 
LES distribution, Korea Economic Evaluation, 2 December 1986.  
24. Ibid. 
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Falling international interest rates and cheap labor costs were driving 
South Korea towards a trade surplus in the years following 1985. To 
encourage growth and diversification, the government planned more local 
investment in small to medium sized companies. Foreign investment, “in 
the form of joint ventures is being encouraged, particularly in areas of 
new technology, with the emphasis on technology transfer.”25 The focus 
of South Korean economic policy in the 1980’s was to upgrade and 
improve export industries through foreign investment and technology 
transfer, particularly in the high-technology sector, while reducing 
imports.  
Early Contacts with Hyundai 
The first discussion of a possible SES sale to South Korea involved the 
Hyundai Corporation, or more specifically, the Hyundai Engineering and 
Construction Company (HDEC). HDEC worked on power plants and the 
various non-nuclear components associated with large-scale power 
distribution systems.26 The first recorded meeting with AECL about the 
SES was in September of 1984.27 
South Korea had initiated a nationwide program to reduce oil 
consumption and dependence on oil imports. HDEC had also contacted 
ASEA Brown Boveri, a Swedish company, concerning the possibility of 
developing a district heating system, but at approximately 400MW its 
SECURE concept was large enough to be outside of AECL’s direct 
competition. During subsequent meetings, the possibility of using the SES 
for an “absorptive cooling cycle” during the summers was also 
considered. HDEC was keenly aware of the government’s desire to 
encourage technology transfer and the development of local technological 
infrastructure, and the company requested that AECL consider a contract 
structure where reactor fuel could be manufactured in South Korea.28 
AECL suggested a graded technology transfer structure for any 
partnership with Hyundai. For the first reactor (the commercial 
demonstration model), AECL would design and manufacture reactor 
components and fuel, and provide project management services. HDEC 
could provide the reactor building, prepare the site, deal with local project 
                                                      
25. AECL archives, newc19-162\1420-3-7v2a, memo from R.D. Gadsby, CANDU Ops, to 
LES distribution, Korea Economic Evaluation, 2 December 1986. 
26. AECL archives, c11-les4\hyundai2.max, memo from Bain to Bancroft, 12 Oct. 1984.  
27. AECL archives, c11-les4\costs.max, meeting between AECL and Hyundai, 27 
September 1984. 
28. AECL archives, c11-les4\hyundai3.max, memo from Bancroft to Bain, RCHO, R.D. 
Gadsby CANDU Ops, W.T. Hancox, WNRE, J.W. Hilborn, CRNL, A.T. Jeffs, AECL - 
Korea, C.G. Lennox, RCHO, J.W. Love, CANDU Ops., S.J. Pearce, AECL Corporate, 
H.K. Rae, CRNL, RE: discussions with Hyundai, 3 October 1984. 
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management, and provide the heat distribution systems for the reactor. 
Subsequent reactor sales would see more and more responsibility 
transferred to HDEC; ultimately, AECL would only be supplying the fuel 
directly, and receiving royalties on the design and construction 
information given to HDEC for local work.29 It was even suggested by 
AECL that a joint venture company could be formed that would allow 
HDEC to manufacture the SES in Asia, rather than AECL.30 
Initial discussions led to the draft of a joint venture agreement between 
the two companies in 1985. AECL agreed to provide a commercial 
demonstration reactor to HDEC, along with the first fuel load and initial 
training for personnel. Estimated cost to AECL was $4-5 million 
Canadian. In return, HDEC would provide local project management to 
AECL Quality Assurance standards, the conventional portions of the 
heating system (e.g. hot water distribution system, reactor building), and 
the local operating license for the reactor. The estimated cost to HDEC for 
this project was approximately $3-4 million Canadian. Revenue from heat 
generated by the first prototype would belong to AECL for the first year, 
and in subsequent years it would be split according to initial investment in 
the project (roughly 60/40 AECL/HDEC).31 
AECL Goes Sour on HDEC 
Private sector joint ventures had proven to be risky for AECL. In 1981 it 
had partnered with Vancouver-based submarine technology company ECS 
to build a nuclear battery for military sub applications. ECS become a 
“hostile partner” in 1984, forming partnerships without AECL’s 
cooperation and threatening lawsuits.32 AECL soon branded HDEC a 
hostile partner as well.  
Discussions with HDEC had revealed that the chairman of the company 
was not even aware of the negotiations over the SES sale. Further inquiries 
revealed that HDEC interest in the SES was linked to a slowdown in work 
at the company, combined with a desire to secure subcontracting work on 
the Wolsung-II reactor. HDEC believed that partnering with AECL on the 
SES would give them a “strong advantage” in the competition for Wolsung-
II work.33 In short, the SES was not the focus of Hyundai interest; lucrative 
contracts for Wolsung-II were the prize. AECL also felt that Hyundai had 
the technical expertise to copy the SES.  
                                                      
29. AECL archives, c11-les4\hyundai2.max, memo from Bain to Bancroft, 12 Oct. 1984. 
30. AECL archives, c11-les4\hyundai.max, memo from Bain to Bancroft, 16 Oct. 1984. 
31. AECL archives, c11-les4\3.3.5.koreav1c.max, meeting minutes from meeting with 
HDEC in Seoul from Sept 23-27, 1985, 27 September 1985. 
32. See Slater, “The Bungling Giant.” 
33. AECL archives, c11-les4\3.3.5.koreav1a, memo from G.F. Lynch to S.R. Hatcher, 
SLOWPOKE in Korea, 13 May 1986.  
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This information led AECL to assume that HDEC would not act in its 
best interests in the future. AECL decided that any partnership with 
HDEC should involve nothing more than the latter company’s business 
expertise and knowledge of the local market, leaving all technical, 
operations and management responsibilities with AECL. The company 
believed that HDEC would attempt to use its government connections to 
gain total control of any partnership between the two companies, if the 
market for the SES proved promising. It followed that any business 
agreement with HDEC should be structured such that AECL would 
maximize its returns in the early stages of the business venture. More 
importantly, under no circumstances should outstanding technical and 
safety details be transferred at this early stage of the collaboration, as it 
was believed that HDEC could and would embark upon the design of its 
own reactor if the market seemed large. AECL’s experience with the 
SLOWPOKE Research Reactor clearly had had an impact.34 
Abandoning HDEC was not without risks, since “HDEC may have 
sufficient momentum to seek an alternative partner” for a small nuclear 
design, such as the SECURE reactor mentioned above. Beyond this, the 
agreement from 1985 would have to be broken in order to terminate the 
relationship between the two companies, and AECL had made com-
mitments in this agreement and subsequent verbal agreements that would 
have to be withdrawn, hopefully without penalty.35 However, as the SES 
project was unknown at the higher levels of HDEC, AECL believed that 
withdrawing at this point would not damage any later attempts to partner 
with the firm.36 
AECL’s ultimate decision was to put HDEC on hold, stop transferring 
technical information, and to pursue its market options without HDEC as 
a primary partner.37 The existence of other potential partners for HDEC 
added competition from small nuclear sources to the SES plate for the 
first time. 
                                                      
34. AECL archives, c11-les4\3.3.5.koreav1a, memo from G.F. Lynch to S.R. Hatcher, 
SLOWPOKE in Korea, 13 May 1986. 
35. Commitments to joint studies, pricing of reactor systems, transfer of design details, 
performance reports on the SDR, financial and operational details from any other sales 
proposals, etc.  For more detail, see AECL archives, c11-les4\3.3.5.koreav1a, memo from 
Lynch to Hatcher, SLOWPOKE in Korea, 13 May 1986; AECL archives, c11-
les4\hyundai.max, memo from Bain to Bancroft, 16 October 1984; AECL archives, c11-
les4\3.3.5.koreav1c.max, meeting minutes from meeting with HDEC in Seoul from 
September 23-27, 1985, 27 September 1985; AECL archives, c11-les4\hyundai2.max, 
memo from Bain to Bancroft, 12 October 1984. 
36. AECL archives, c11-les4\3.3.5.koreav1a, memo from Lynch to Hatcher, SLOWPOKE 
in Korea, 13 May 1986. 
37. Ibid. 
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Government Led Energy Reform and the SES 
Various government policies in South Korea had driven up the price for 
bunker-C oil, the primary oil used in district heating, to about double that 
of the world average. In pursuit of economic stability, the government 
encouraged long-term fixed-price contracts for oil, which also drove up 
oil prices.38 With the government introducing levies to deal with the 
environmental threat of burning fossil fuels, oil prices rose and nuclear 
power was seen as a potentially cheap substitute.39 
As of 1986, the Korean Energy Utilization Act (created in 1979) had 
established a set of incentives and penalties around the “rational use” of 
energy sources.  Efficient use and safe operation were stressed, as well as 
environmental concerns to reduce pollution. The Korean Minister of 
Energy and Resources was responsible for energy planning, and the 
government run Korean Energy Management Company (KEMCO) was in 
charge of obtaining facilities for energy distribution, monitoring and 
licensing of equipment, and research in alternative energy sources. 
Through KEMCO the minister had access to the Energy Utilization 
Fund.40 
With the South Korean market for the SES defined, and negotiations 
with HDEC behind it, AECL still faced hurdles. In 1987 AECL Corporate 
stressed that the SES must be competitive at international oil prices, not at 
inflated South Korean prices, to be acceptable to the South Korean 
government. This necessitated “firming up” the cost estimates for the SES 
commercial prototype, which essentially meant pushing the development 
program in Canada in order to gain reliable performance information and 
cost estimates. It was also decided that the SES should be competitive on 
a unit-to-unit sale basis, rather than delaying profits by securing lucrative 
long-term heating contracts. This tactic was designed to put the profits up 
front, in part to minimize any losses due to unintended technology transfer 
or hostile actions on the part of a South Korean partner.41 The only sort of 
long-term business to be sought was operations, fuel supply and 
maintenance work. This emphasis on short term profit by AECL is a clear 
indication of the impact of competition on the crown corporation. 
                                                      
38. Fixed price contracts generally provide an item at a slightly higher price, the “cost” of 
price stability. 
39. AECL archives, newc19-162\1420-3-7v2c, fax from Kay to G. Kugler, 5 Nov. 1985.  
40. AECL archives, newc19-162\1420-3-7v2b, memo from D.S. McDougall to R.E. Kay, 
7 November 1986. 
41. AECL archives, newc19-162\1420-3-7v3a, meeting notes on Korea at RCHO Ottawa, 
6 January 1987. Political persuasion and strong patenting were also suggested as potential 
protective mechanisms.  
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Any commercial demonstration reactor sold to South Korea would have 
to be installed at a government-approved site, and AECL anticipated that 
the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) would be the site 
of the first sale. KAERI facilities were located in a temperate zone, so 
heating demand would be low, and existing systems were steam based, so 
efficiencies would be lower as well. This implied that the initial 
commercial sale in South Korea would be economically disadvantaged, so 
competitive, efficient design was absolutely necessary. The decision was 
also made to continue limited information exchange with HDEC to reduce 
the possibility of having “annoyed parties” in South Korea before the first 
sale.42 It was thought to be to AECL’s advantage to find a smaller partner 
with less technical ability, to reduce the possibility of copying. 
As a nuclear technology, any South Korean SES would have first to be 
accepted by the government. Nuclear power was government run and 
regulated in South Korea, and government approval was a precursor to 
any commercial sales. To secure greater government support, AECL 
considered hiring a senior level political consultant with experience in any 
or all of the relevant government agencies, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST), Ministry of Energy and Resources (MER), and to a 
lesser degree the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade (MOT). 
$5,000-10,000 Canadian per month was allocated from the budget for the 
expected salary of such a representative.43 
Striking While the Iron Was Hot: The Business Environment for 
Nuclear Heating 
By March of 1987 it was decided that the next priority for the project 
was the formation of a joint venture agreement with someone other than 
HDEC. The main resources needed from a partner were market 
knowledge and knowledge of South Korean licensing requirements for the 
reactor. Despite the unsuccessful relationship with HDEC, securing a 
local partner was seen as an important step for successful sales.44 
Though a joint venture agreement was seen as a necessary part of any 
commercial business in South Korea, AECL had some choice of dancing 
partner. AECL planned to go ahead with a SES prototype at a KAERI site, 
partnering with the South Korean government rather than a local business. 
                                                      
42. AECL archives, newc19-162\1420-3-7v3a, meeting notes on Korea at RCHO Ottawa, 
6 January 1987. 
43. Ibid. See Robert Bothwell, Nucleus, The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 430-436 for a discussion of AECL problems 
with sales agents.  
44. AECL archives, newc19-162\1420-3-7v3c, LES memo from Kay to McDougall, 5 
March 1987.  
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This decision was motivated by the troubles with HDEC and the 
increasing pressure to produce a commercial prototype to kick-off the 
business.45 
The pressure to produce a commercial prototype in South Korea went 
beyond the general need for a SES demonstration facility. Three factors in 
the South Korean situation made it unadvisable to wait for an appropriate 
private sector joint venture partner. First, Canadian government support 
for further CANDU sales in South Korea was strong at this point, and 
high level lobbying of South Korean ministries was aggressively pursued, 
especially after the South Korean government considered an American 
company for the Wolsung-II bid.46  
The successful collaboration between KAERI and AECL on the Korea 
Multipurpose Research Reactor (KMRR) and the Wolsung-I reactor had 
created a good working relationship between the two organizations and 
contacts with key players in South Korean government.47 AECL was 
hoping to piggyback on government support and institutional familiarity. 
Any movement to reduce the political and economic barriers to CANDU 
nuclear reactor sales in South Korea could, in principle at least, encourage 
SES sales as well.48 However, KMRR was a finite project, and the 
Wolsung-II bid had a limited time window, as AECL was well aware.49 
Market analyses also suggested that a viable market existed for nuclear 
heating. Apartment complexes were important potential clients, and many 
of these ran on medium to low temperature distributed water, ideal for the 
                                                      
45. AECL archives, newc19-162\1420-3-7v3e, memo from Lynch to McDougall and Kay, 
13 May 1987.  
46. The American bid for Wolsung-II, led by Westinghouse, was not without its own 
problems. KEPCO, the Korean electricity utility, had recently discovered that Westinghouse 
had charged disproportionately large fees for spare parts and services for existing PWR 
reactors in Korea. This “gouging” practice was widely resented in the company and AECL’s 
forthright business dealings for Wolsung-I parts and services were considered a strong 
competitive advantage in the CANDU and SES bids. AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5.vol3a, 
fax from Keating to Lawson, Gadsby, McCardle, LES Team, 27 March 1987.  
47. AECL archives, C11-les4\koreaprop, proposal for the Korea District Heating 
Corporation, 1 October 1988.  
48. AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5.vol3a, fax from Keating to Lawson, Gadsby, McCardle, 
LES Team, 27 March 1987. 
49. To qualify this claim of organizational and political familiarity, the AECL Korean 
office cited the following list of influential Korean politicians involved with AECL at 
some level through Wolsong-I and KMRR, “Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
responsible for the Economic Planning Board Rha Woong-bae (well known to us)… 
Minister of Energy and Resources, Dr. Lee Bong-suh (quite well known to us)… Minister 
of Science and Technology, Dr. Lee Kwan (he is not well known to us but he has a nuclear 
physics background and is known to be a proponent of nuclear energy)… and Minister of 
Trade and Industry Ahn Byong-wha (known to us).” AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5vol4a, 
fax from Keating to Lawson, LES Team, 2 March 1988. 
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SES, rather than high-temperature steam.50 There were some 
modifications needed with the heat exchangers in older apartment 
complexes, but these were due for replacement and could be paid for from 
the Energy Utilization Fund.51 
Figure 3.   A Chinese Promotional Poster for the SES. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AECL archives, ID: C20-LES6, © Atomic Energy of Canada Limited,1985. 
 
In addition, South Korea’s desire for greater energy independence, 
combined with an increasing demand for power to fuel economic growth, 
made the government amenable to energy initiatives that reduced foreign 
oil imports and encouraged price stability. As district heating was 
responsible for a significant portion of oil use, and fuel price stability was 
an advantage of long term nuclear fuel contracts, the SES was uniquely 
                                                      
50. See figure 3 for a photo of an apartment complex taken from a Chinese SES 
promotional poster. 
51. AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5vol3b, Korea Economic Evaluation, Scouten, Mitchel, 
Sigurdson and Associates, 1 June 1987.  
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placed to suit the needs of the South Korean government. Successful 
installation and operation of a commercial prototype directly at KAERI 
would most likely speed up government approval of the SES.52 
The Korean District Heating Corporation, created in 1985 and 50% 
owned by KEPCO, Korea’s electric utility, had recently embarked on a 
wide scale district heating study. The plan was to replace scattered small, 
inefficient local heating units with small-scale district heating systems for 
industrial and apartment building complexes and small communities. 
Traditional local heating methods for buildings in South Korea included 
individual charcoal fires, a source of serious pollution. KDHC had already 
started to integrate these local systems, replacing charcoal with oil 
heating, and it was hoped that the combination of higher capital costs, 
equivalent operation and maintenance costs, with much lower and more 
stable fuel costs, would make the SES an appealing substitute.53 
In summary, the respective governments were willing and able to support 
nuclear development, there was a well-defined and significant market for 
the technology, a well-developed nuclear infrastructure, familiarity with 
both government and industrial sources of nuclear expertise, good working 
relationships with influential government ministers, and an existing South 
Korean district heating initiative to develop new power systems for off oil 
heating at the level of the SES.  
The Korean District Heating Corporation as a Potential Partner 
The SES project did not yet have an office in South Korea, so AECL 
CANDU staff working there did some of the legwork for the Korean SES 
sale. In early December of 1988, AECL CANDU representatives met with 
KDHC to discuss the SES bid. Much to its surprise, AECL discovered 
that KDHC had strong reservations about the SES. It listed several 
concerns: 
1. AECL fuel price was too high 
2. There was no working 10MW commercial prototype 
3. Offering a subsidy on the first unit was suspicious, as KDHC had had past 
experience with, “foreigners cheating them.” 
4. The timelines for various SES projects were too long 
                                                      
52. AECL archives, newc19-162\1420-3-7v3f, memo from Lynch to Keating, Tighe and 
Kugler, 19 January 1988. 
53. AECL archives, C11-les4\koreaprop, proposal for the Korea District Heating 
Corporation, 1 October 1988. In the winter of 1987-88 KDHC installed a large oil fired 
district heating system, “supplying some 40000 living units and several office buildings… 
in the city on the Han River.” KDHC expressed interest in substituting an SES for this oil 
source. AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5vol4a, fax from Keating to Lawson, LES Team, 2 
March 1988.  
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These concerns were quite unexpected, as KDHC had expressed early 
enthusiasm for the SES, and few initial reservations. Beyond accepting an 
AECL proposal for a heating unit in Tunas, it had said and done very 
little.54 
Gerry Lynch, project manager for the SES, decided to visit Korea in 
person and discuss these issues. A face-to-face meeting produced 
improved results. Lynch was excited by the KDHC response: 
The deal for the first unit is within our grasp. It's not a big economic challenge and, 
with the bulk of the payment up front, AECL's financial exposure is very limited. 
Furthermore, the support from the customer and the Korean Government couldn't 
be better.55 
What convinced Lynch that things had changed? KDHC actively 
discussed the program, and made several early concessions. AECL was 
told it could increase its fuel costs if oil prices continued to rise, as long as 
initial fuel costs were kept low to satisfy the public. It offered to design 
the hot water distribution system in Tunsan to meet SES-10 design 
requirements, even though it was not known if Tunsan would be the first 
SES site. Lynch returned to Canada for Christmas confident of the 
direction of the Korean sale.  
New Years… New Troubles: Labor Unrest, Competition and 
Technical Progress 
Korea ended 1988 with a $7.5 billion trade surplus and a thriving 
economy. Electrical demand growth in 1988 was 15.5%, with 
approximately 47% of that coming from nuclear power. KEPCO was 
projecting a growth in total Korean electrical capacity to 35.7 GW by 
2001, and planned for the construction of at least three new nuclear plants 
(including Wolsung-II) by that time. With a booming economy and the 
promise of rising demand for power, the Korean government proposed the 
partial privatization of KEPCO.56 
However, along with this growth and profit came labor unrest and 
concerns over the direction of government expansion. Large successful 
companies such as Daewoo, Hyundai and Samsung experienced damaging 
strikes and demonstrations in early 1989.57 By March, police forces had 
                                                      
54. KDHC had recently been given the responsibility of providing the energy supply for 
Tunsan, a newly built industrial, R&D and residential community. AECL archives, C9-
les5\3.3.5.vol5a, minutes of meetings in Seoul Korea, between KDHC and AECL, 5-8 
December 1988. 
55. AECL archives, C11-les4\4.13.1KoreaPropA, memo from Lynch to Hatcher and 
Lennox, 13 December 1988.  
56. AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5.vol5b, fax from Keating to Lawson, 26 January 1989.  
57. Ibid. 
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been authorized to use firearms to protect public property and the personal 
safety of the police, and a bill was being debated to provide strong prison 
sentences for the use of firebombs in public demonstrations.58 Labor 
unrest was a relatively new phenomenon in Korea at the time, and both 
government and industry leaders were unsure how to react.59 
This was the setting for a June meeting between the AECL and Yoon 
Myong Park, President of KDHC. Park expressed interest in the SES, but 
with caveats:  
a) A commercial prototype at the 10MW level had to be built in Canada 
b) AECL had to demonstrate competitive economics  
c) Public approval in Canada had to be obtained 
d) AECL had to successfully license a SES in Canada 
If these conditions were met, KDHC was willing to go to the Ministry of 
Energy and Resources for funding. Park spoke of three new suburbs near 
Seoul, with projected populations of half a million each, which were ideal 
for a set of SES reactors.60 
However, Park was clearly concerned with AECL’s ability to deliver on 
its promises of efficiency and economy, thus the demand for a successful 
commercial prototype installation in Canada. He was further concerned 
with potential public resistance to the reactor, thus the demand for 
successful Canadian licensing61 and public approval as a benchmark of 
SES acceptance. Park pointed out that KDHC did not have the technical 
resources to design its own reactor, with a staff of only 70 or so technical 
people, and no in-house nuclear experience.  
However, it was very interested in nuclear power, and the recent Korean 
government decision to pass a law “preventing the burning of coal and high 
sulphur oil in Seoul” as of October 1989 only increased this interest. To 
ensure AECL of its commitment to nuclear, Park pointed out that KDHC 
had approached at least two other companies, General Atomics and ABB. 
The former had proposed to modify its Triga research reactor for local 
heating, the latter had an existing design for the SECURE reactor. Park sug-
gested that twin SES reactors and an oil boiler would be ideal for Tunsan.62 
                                                      
58. AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5.vol5c, fax from Keating to Lawson, LES Team, 27 
March 1989. 
59. Ibid. 
60. AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5.vol5d, meeting minutes, 21 June 1989. 
61. Licensing models for other international clients, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 
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Several weeks after the meeting with President Park, the Korea-Canada 
Joint Coordinating Committee on Nuclear Energy met in Seoul to discuss 
collaboration between KEPCO and AECL. KEPCO announced that it was 
sidestepping the Canadian restriction on domestic reprocessing of 
yellowcake by purchasing uranium from Australia for the CANDU reactor 
at Wolsong-1. KAERI had recently completed a uranium reprocessing 
facility, demonstrating Korean technical skills in the nuclear field. AECL 
reiterated its strong desire to be chosen in the Wolsung-II bid. In response, 
KAERI requested expanded assistance and, “bilateral cooperation on 
waste management, nuclear safety, operations and maintenance needs at 
Wolsong-1.”63 
The meeting finished with a presentation on the progress of the SES 
proposal in Canada (at Sherbrooke and Saskatchewan), which was not 
encouraging, to say the least. By the summer of 1989 Sherbrooke had 
been abandoned, and Saskatchewan was progressing painfully slowly, 
despite apparently strong industrial and government interest. The 
appearance of public resistance to the sale in the Sherbrooke case 
discouraged the Korean representatives, due to the emergence of wide 
ranging public resistance to nuclear power in Korea as of the winter of 
1988.64 Public demonstrations, in many cases violent, had delayed 
construction on new nuclear plants and interfered with site selection 
surveys for low-to-medium-level radioactive waste depositories and 
away-from-reactor spent fuel facilities.65 
Internal Reactions to Slow Development 
The SES project was located within a “business unit,” an independent 
division of AECL Research, created with a group of other business units 
to exploit the commercial potential of AECL technologies. AECL 
Corporate was established in the late 1950’s and was the business end of 
                                                                                                                         
nuclear with small nuclear systems was not uncommon, either as back up or as redundancy 
in case of technical problems. 
63. AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5.vol5i, minutes from the meeting of the 7th Korea-
Canada Joint Coordinating Committee on Nuclear Energy, 30 June 1989. 
64. For more on Sherbrooke and Saskatchewan, see Slater, “The Bungling Giant.” 
65. KAERI was bargaining hard with the Canadian delegation, perhaps as it realized what 
AECL had come to realize at the time, namely that international markets for CANDU were 
the company’s primary option. So, when AECL pointed out during the meeting that 
Canada’s restrictions on “further processing” of uranium outside of the country did not 
apply to the US, KAERI representatives pointed out that they might very well purchase 
processed uranium from the US rather than directly from Canada if the economics were 
competitive. AECL representatives could only respond that they were seeking “a 
ministerial exception” to the further processing rule for uranium to be used in Wolsung-1. 
AECL archives, C9-les5\3.3.5.vol5i, minutes from the meeting of the 7th Korea-Canada 
Joint Coordinating Committee on Nuclear Energy, 30 June 1989. 
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AECL as a whole. Corporate was responsible for the marketing and sales 
of all AECL product lines, from the CANDU to the SES to technical 
consulting services (e.g. reactor maintenance). AECL Corporate formed a 
nexus of marketing and commercial experience for the whole company. 
Its location in the nation’s capital meant that AECL Corporate was well-
placed to influence the federal government as well as international players 
in the nuclear power policy sector.66 
Frank McDonnell of AECL Corporate was critical of recent progress in 
the Korean sale. McDonnell sent a memo to Al Bancroft, the Business 
Opportunity Development team leader for the SES project, detailing his 
concerns with the Korean proposal. McDonnell pointed out that contact 
with KDHC had been established in the summer of 1987, it was now the 
summer of 1989 and 
We are still in this preliminary assessment phase and have yet to: participate in a 
cooperative study with any Korean organization, assess a specific site to establish 
technical and economic feasibility, and consider the options for business 
arrangements in Korea.67 
It was clear to McDonnell, based on the slow progress of the Korean 
business, that KDHC was not interested in nuclear power in the near 
future.  
McDonnell felt that Korean experience with public unrest and anti-
nuclear demonstrations was limited, and that this was scaring off KDHC 
from an untested foreign nuclear reactor. McDonnell went further, noting 
KDHC’s interest in other nuclear suppliers and its treatment of AECL, 
arguing that KDHC only approached AECL as the Ministry of Energy and 
Resources (MER) requested them to approach several nuclear suppliers. 
In other words, KDHC’s interest was forced by MER.68 McDonnell 
recommended terminating the relationship with KDHC and pursuing one 
with KAERI.  
Ron Keating was a staff member of AECL CANDU assigned to Korea 
as part of the Wolsung-1 bid. He was the primary Korean contact for 
AECL, and a source of local knowledge since at least 1987. Keating sent a 
memo to Bancroft, the SES Project Manager, explaining what he felt was 
the real stumbling block to Korean cooperation. 
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Keating claimed that KDHC was holding back because AECL had yet to 
complete a 10MW commercial prototype of its reactor. Until a 
commercial unit was constructed and licensed in Canada, the Koreans 
were hesitant to move forward. He agreed with McDonnell that they were 
somewhat concerned about public reaction, another reason they were 
interested in AECL’s technical progress.69 Nonetheless they were keenly 
interested in nuclear power, and their attention to AECL and the SES was 
genuine, “KDHC invited the proposal because they wanted it; they were 
not coerced.”70  
According to Keating, the SES project was looking for a short cut in 
KDHC. Any nuclear development in Korea relied upon ministerial 
approval and the involvement of KAERI and KEPCO, dealing exclusively 
with KDHC was not an option. Progress with other organizations would 
bring KDHC back into the picture. Specifically, KAERI was needed to 
secure government approval, clear licensing hurdles, and cultivate public 
acceptance of the reactor.71 Keating’s comments had considerable 
influence with SES personnel, so they took him seriously when he 
claimed the game was still afoot. 
Controversy Strikes: Economic Expansion and its Discontents 
In order to do business in Korea, AECL needed more than just the 
approval of the Korean government, it also needed the cooperation of 
local industry and utilities in order to build and operate its technology 
locally. This made the SES project dependant upon the status of local 
organizations. November of 1989 brought more difficult news to AECL, 
with charges of negligence and bad faith bargaining in the Korean power 
industry. 
The first charge was leveled in November of 1989 against KEPCO, 
Korea’s electric utility. The Atomic Energy Bureau (AEB), the regulatory 
division within the Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), 
filed a criminal complaint against KEPCO for negligence on three 
occasions in 1988. The specific complaints related to regular safety 
checks at two different reactors, one at Yong-gwang and the other at Kori. 
Safety checks necessitated reducing reactor power. KEPCO did not 
perform three of these regular scheduled checks, as they occurred during 
special events, the Seoul Olympics, the Seoul Para-Olympics, and the 
National Assembly elections.72 
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KEPCO maintained that the checks were not urgent, and any dip in 
power during these events would have been extremely disruptive and 
embarrassing to the Korean government.73 Fortunately for AECL, 
although Wolsung-1 also put off safety checks for similar reasons, station 
management had obtained the approval of the local Atomic Energy 
Bureau inspector prior to doing so, and as a result they were not 
mentioned in the press articles or in the Atomic Energy Bureau 
complaint.74 
The second critical event occurred during an attempted “rescue” effort 
with the Korea Heavy Industries and Construction company, KHIC. 
KHIC was a government company that employed approximately 6500 
people and specialized in the manufacture of power generating facilities 
for the government utility KEPCO. KHIC was heavily in debt (estimated 
at approximately 421 billion Won, or approximately $650 million 
Canadian), and the Korean government decided to privatize the company 
through an open bidding process between Korean industries.75 The 
bidding started with four companies, and was quickly narrowed down to 
two major bidders, Samsung and Hyundai, and a smaller company, Korea 
Chemical.  
Korea Chemical was disqualified from the bidding when it was 
discovered that the president of the company was the brother of one of the 
founders and senior board members of Hyundai. Then, at the last minute, 
Samsung withdrew from the bidding process, citing the huge debt load of 
KHIC as the stumbling block.76 Within a day allegations emerged that 
Samsung and Hyundai had collaborated on the withdrawal of Samsung 
from the bidding. Supposedly, the president of Hyundai had contacted 
Samsung and asked it to withdraw at the last minute, which would spoil 
the bidding process entirely. Hyundai’s motivation in this deal was a 
condition put on the sale by the government, namely that the successful 
bidder would have to “finance the purchase by selling its subsidiaries” in 
order to keep either of the already huge companies from getting bigger. 
Hyundai denied the allegations.77 
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The truth of the allegations against KEPCO and Hyundai aside, they 
were another setback for AECL. Any nuclear project in Korea relied upon 
local industry and government cooperation, and public support. The 
government utility had been charged by another branch of government 
with negligence at two of its nuclear facilities. A company that supplied 
KEPCO, KHIC, was deep in debt and considered economically 
undesirable by two of Korea’s most prominent industrial powerhouses. 
Public distrust in the government, and public suspicion surrounding the 
power industry, undercut public approval for a SES sale. 
The Korean Response: Back in Business 
After this poor public performance, the Korean government came back 
to AECL ready to do business. Although KAERI had previously agreed 
with KDHC that a precondition of sale for the SES was a successful 
commercial unit demonstration in Canada, it now withdrew that 
requirement. It did not, however, withdraw its requirement that the reactor 
be licensed in Canada first. MOST, who were previously responsible for 
bringing a legal action against KEPCO, made a public announcement in 
an annual report to the President that it would be pursuing a joint 
development program with AECL to build a SES for the 1993 
International Industry and Trade Exposition. MOST cited a budget of $34 
million (US) for the project.78 
KAERI’s renewed interest was not lost on AECL, and a meeting was 
organized in Korea for April. The meeting, which included several hours 
with KAERI president Dr. Ham Pilson, went exceedingly well. Pilson 
mentioned that the use of liquefied natural gas in district heating 
initiatives put the SES in a favorable position, as it was fairly expensive in 
Korea. He even suggested the possibility of the Korean Energy Ministry 
“adopting” the SES as a “national fuel” for district heating purposes. This 
sort of exclusivity was exactly what AECL was hoping for.79 
One thing was clear from the meetings with all KAERI staff, in addition 
to an expected doubling of the cost of heating in Seoul due to a 
switchover to natural gas,80 “towns that could use the SLOWPOKE 
Energy System are being built without us because we are not ready yet. In 
other words, hurry up, the market is there now.”81 
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There were, however, concerns with KAERI’s renewed interest, no least 
amongst them was the possibility of “unintended technology transfer” if 
the Koreans were technologically advanced enough to reverse engineer 
the reactor from the prototype unit. This concern emerged after 
discussions with other KAERI representatives revealed an apparent lack 
of interest in commercializing the technology with AECL beyond the first 
unit. It seemed that AECL would provide the first reactor and then 
KAERI would build the rest, using AECL for consulting, operations and 
maintenance services, as well as fuel. AECL’s experience with the 
copying of the SLOWPOKE research reactor suggested that KAERI 
might copy the design and then gradually phase out AECL.82 Still, the 
market was large, and the desire to secure a commercial prototype 
overwhelmed concerns over the technology being copied at a later date. 
AECL’s Side of the Deal: Negotiation, Licensing and Joint Ventures 
A lucrative market was available, KAERI was alongside as a potential 
partner, and AECL had made significant links to the industrial and nuclear 
infrastructure in South Korea.  The company had good reason to pursue 
the South Korean market for its first successful international SES sale. In 
order to make this sale happen, it had to organize the South Korean 
initiative to deal with potential bottlenecks.  
Even if there was a short term market for district heating, and a 
favourable relationship between the Korean government and AECL, this 
was still a competitive process with long-term marketing and business 
goals to be considered. Mitch Ohta, the engineering and projects manager 
for the SES, sent several memos to Al Bancroft in the summer of 1991 
expressing concerns with AECL’s negotiating position in Korea.  
His first concern was the lack of direct knowledge of the Korean nuclear 
market in the SES project. The company had relied upon periodic visits to 
Korea, and the substantive input provided by representatives from AECL 
CANDU in Seoul. However, as it was about to enter into a more complex 
negotiation of long-term contracts and joint venture agreements, more 
than just information was needed. Its AECL CANDU contacts were 
occupied with Wolsung-I operations and the Wolsung-II bid, and they 
were not familiar with the project specifications for the SES.83 
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Ohta’s second concern related to the structure of the agreement with 
KAERI. He pointed out that AECL seemed too eager to define a business 
relationship with the Koreans before technical work was complete. AECL 
representatives such as John Barclay and Victor Snell84 had pushed too 
hard to finalize various commercial aspects of the project as they were 
“project oriented people” and thus more concerned with project 
definitions and commercial agreements than with design, something that 
did not work well with their “research oriented” Korean partners.85 Given 
that different Korean partner organizations (KAERI, KDHC) had 
requested a successfully licensed Canadian commercial prototype SES as 
a precondition of a business relationship with AECL, Ohta’s concerns 
seem justified.   
Licensing itself was another potential bottleneck. There were no 
guarantees that a successful license in Canada would mean a license in 
Korea as well. In the past Korea had taken successful licensing in Canada 
plus a letter from the AECB as sufficient. Wolsung-I, various research 
reactors, and later Wolsung-II, were licensed in this fashion.86 However, 
the SES was a new reactor design, and the Wolsung reactors were 
CANDU-6 designs, with many years of successful operating history 
behind them.  
Responding to these concerns, the licensing manager for the SES, Victor 
Snell, pushed for finalization of reactor design parameters as soon as 
possible. Late stage design changes for the SES (in the passive shutdown 
system and the riser duct) had been considered in order to make the 
reactor licensable in certain European countries (Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia and Romania), but Snell argued that these changes would only 
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hold up the licensing process for viable current clients like Korea. 
Committing to a design and moving forward with the AECB was 
considered to be the best route to a Korean sale.87 
A final potential bottleneck was the precise nature of the business 
agreement between the two organizations. Snell argued that AECL should 
model the agreement on a previous contract between AECL and KAERI 
for the KMRR. In this agreement, AECL was paid $2.9 million for 
“transferring the conceptual design technology” and $22.6 million for 
“designing and supplying the reactor.”88  
Snell suggested a research reactor contract as a potential model for the 
reactor sale, rather than a power reactor model. In the case of power 
reactors, profits are made through long-term fixed fuel price contracts and 
generous estimates of capital costs, as fuel is the cheapest element in the 
technology, and capital costs tend to be higher than initially estimated.89 
Smaller research reactors often offer “black-box” contracts, as production 
and manufacturing costs are manageable, and the technology is more 
reliable. Black-box contracts encourage up-front profits by providing a 
completed technology ready for installation and operation by the client, 
rather than using the partnership as an opportunity for further development. 
In this model, AECL’s partners absorbed the relatively minor SES project 
costs, namely manufacturing and installation.90 
Ohta pushed for a joint venture with a Korean company, and rejected the 
black-box option. A joint venture was a necessity in Ohta’s eyes as: 
a) It would draw on AECL’s good reputation in Korea 
b) It would provide some financial resources for AECL from the local partner 
c) It would provide technical resources for AECL from the local partner 
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These were immediate benefits, but the joint-venture would also involve 
close technical cooperation, and thus close monitoring of the technology 
transfer to ensure that the SES design was not appropriated by the Korean 
partner.91 
There were other subsidiary concerns with a joint venture. There was the 
possibility that the technology would cease to be identified as Canadian if 
the Korean partner was sufficiently involved in the project, and visibility 
to the market was important at this stage of the project, with no 
commercial prototype in existence. Finally, Ohta stressed that the strong 
business orientation of the Korea sale could lead to the selection of a 
partner that “may meet marketing needs without sufficient project 
management and project engineering skills, construction and civil work 
experience.”92   
The End of the Road 
KAERI came to the table in late 1991 with a solid proposal for AECL. It 
was interested in developing nuclear power as a general district heating 
technology, in order to meet MOST demands to reduce oil consumption. 
It proposed a partnership with AECL on the construction of an SES at 
Daeduk, to be completed by 1995.93 This was a solid offer that would 
presumably result in a commercial prototype, one desperately needed by 
AECL as several of its other opportunities had fallen through.94 
By January of the new year, things began to unravel. Funding 
opportunities on the Korean side were proving elusive. The minister of 
MOST put a freeze on funding for nuclear district heating, due to recent 
violent demonstrations over the siting of nuclear power plants. Until a 
satisfactory site could be located, funding was frozen.95 
The appointment of a new president at KAERI had led to staff 
reorganizations at the company, reorganizations that had left no individual 
or group in the company specifically dedicated to the SES project or to 
district heating technology in general. Budget overruns on the KMRR, in 
addition to extensive project delays, had tarnished AECL’s local 
reputation for delivering projects on time and on budget.96 By the end of 
the year the SES had been abandoned by AECL as a product, and the 
Korea initiative was dropped with it.  
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Contingent Factors in the South Korean Sale of the SES 
A number of contingent factors contributed to the failure of the South 
Korean initiative. First, there were good reasons to believe that the SES 
might be copied. The Koreans were already familiar with CANDU 
technology through KEPCO and Wolsung-I, and CANDU design 
expertise had been incorporated into the SES (e.g. fuel bundle design). 
The SES was small-scale and much simpler than the CANDU, and thus 
easier to copy. Further, South Korea had demonstrated its ability to 
develop independent nuclear technology when it purchased unprocessed 
uranium from the Australians. Conflicting signals from Korean partners 
over the details of long-term partnerships signalled the possibility that 
they might intend to partner with AECL for the first few reactors, and 
then design their own version. Feasibility studies with other small nuclear 
suppliers fed this suspicion. Added to all of this was the fact that AECL 
had to rely on a Korean partner to do the local engineering and 
manufacturing work if a sale was ever made. Information transfer to 
Korean partners was restricted, and reactor contracts were structured to 
maximize up-front profits in the event that the technology was copied and 
the market was lost.  
Public resistance to nuclear technology was also a factor in the South 
Korean SES sale, but an indirect one. Public resistance to government 
initiatives was new to South Korea, and the assumption was that the kind 
of resistance experienced with large-scale nuclear power would be applied 
to the SES. The South Koreans monitored the Canadian situation closely, 
and when public resistance emerged in Sherbrooke and Saskatchewan, 
they took it as a sign that Korean sales also have problems. Korea was 
experiencing labor unrest and violent public demonstrations. In this 
context, the SES was associated with the sort of violent protest that had 
never occurred in Canada. 
These concerns led various South Korean partners to make demands that 
AECL could not meet at that time. A completed commercial 
demonstration of the technology and successful Canadian licensing were 
both required. The South Korean government was concerned about giving 
the growing anti-nuclear movement fodder for public resistance to further 
nuclear development. The safety-check scandal at KEPCO and the fiasco 
over the KHIC sale further reduced Korean tolerance for controversy with 
new nuclear technology. This was clearly demonstrated when MOST 
froze funding for nuclear district heating until public acceptance could be 
assured. South Korea wanted a technology that would be reliable, safe and 
economical before presenting it to the potentially hostile public. This 
required a demonstration of the technology at the requisite power level.  
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It is not quite right, however, to say that public resistance to nuclear 
power was a significant problem for the SES in South Korea. First of all, 
the “resistance” was entirely from the government, in anticipation of 
future public resistance to the SES. It was not known if something as 
small as the SES would have triggered violent protests of the kind that so 
intimidated KAERI. Secondly, the demand for a working licensed 
prototype was not only made to deal with public resistance, there was also 
the matter of wanting a safe reactor. The South Korean government was 
willing to do business with AECL as long as it had a licensed, operating 
product; public resistance to that product was still an unknown.  
Impact of Commercial Factors in the South Korean Sale of the SES 
Beyond these contingent factors, there is a more basic issue at stake in 
the South Korean story, one that is especially important if we are to 
understand the nature of innovation at state-owned commercial enterprises 
in Canada and abroad. Time and again, AECL’s focus on the commercial 
side of the South Korean initiative was a stumbling block. Rather than 
coming forward with a completed prototype design and looking for 
clients, AECL sought to develop the basic design by first securing 
commercial partners. This approach led to various difficulties: concerns 
over partners copying the technology, licensing complications and 
reluctance on the part of South Korean partners to move forward until 
designs were finalized and the efficiency of a new technology was 
demonstrated.  
However, AECL is a crown corporation, and the economic and policy 
literature on state ownership versus private ownership suggests that this 
sort of unitary focus on commercial goals by a crown corporation is 
unusual. It is generally regarded that state owned enterprises pursue 
“multiple and often blurred or ill-articulated objectives”97 due to their 
prioritization of “social welfare goals.”98 For example, limiting 
unemployment, resisting foreign capital, subsidizing goods and services, 
integrating community, extending services, promoting protectionist 
policy, maximizing output, eliminating price discrimination and regional 
development have all been cited as examples of non-commercial goals 
pursued by state-owned enterprises.99 The assumption is that “public 
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enterprises’ association with the state shelters them from the discipline of 
market forces,”100 allowing state-owned enterprises to set aside 
commercial concerns in favor of these broader social goals. Clearly this 
was not the case with AECL.  
What could explain AECL’s decision to focus on commercial priorities 
in this case? One possibility is that AECL was pursuing export markets, 
thus short-circuiting the normal social welfare goals associated with 
crown corporations, goals which are often national rather than 
international. Indeed, Duane Bratt’s recent study of AECL’s pursuit of 
export markets for the CANDU provides a possible context for the South 
Korean case. Bratt shows that various factors have shaped the fate of 
CANDU exports since the inception of AECL in the 1950’s: the need to 
contain the spread of communism, concerns about nuclear proliferation, 
restrictions on sales to countries with records of human rights abuse, 
concerns over environmental impacts, and concerns over the extent of 
government subsidies to the nuclear industry.   
Bratt claims that economic concerns, the containment of communism, 
and proliferation concerns have been far more prominent factors in 
CANDU exports than concerns over human rights, environmental 
impacts, and nuclear industry subsidies. He explains this using Cranford 
Pratt’s dominant class theory: decisions related to the Canadian nuclear 
issues are heavily influenced by the pro-nuclear lobby, composed of 
members of Canada’s dominant class. Thus, the concerns of that class— 
economic, proliferation and containment concerns—were primary (at 
different times and to different degrees), and the concerns associated with 
other classes (human rights, the environment and subsidies) were 
marginalized. This analysis goes some way to explaining the results in the 
South Korean case. Still, if his analytic framework is correct, then there 
should have been three factors influencing SES sales in South Korea, not 
just one. Why were proliferation and containment concerns not significant 
in the South Korean case?  Two explanations suggest themselves. 
With respect to the SES, its smaller scale and minimal fuel enrichment 
meant that it was a minimal proliferation risk. Even if the fuel core of 
the SES was removed and the uranium extracted, it would have proven 
impractical to attempt to enrich the fuel to weapons grade. With respect 
to the containment of communism, South Korea was not a communist 
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state, and there was no real risk of the SES technology falling into 
communist hands, and little consequence if it did. Thus the design of the 
SES itself obviated both of these concerns, leaving only economic 
concerns behind.  
The other possible explanation for the dominance of economic concerns 
in the SES sale to South Korea is that the standard view of state-owned 
enterprises presented above is flawed. I have argued elsewhere for this 
conclusion.101 In short, governments around the world have applied neo-
liberal policies to state run organizations, attempting to apply the 
‘discipline of market forces’ mentioned above to the business of the state. 
As a result, state owned corporations have become more and more like 
profit oriented private sector organizations, making the standard picture of 
government run industry appear increasingly antiquated.  
Canada was no exception to this general trend, with the Canadian 
government enforcing fiscal discipline, commercial goals, and outright 
privatization on state owned enterprises. For example, between 1985 and 
2003 the federal government in Canada privatized over $10 billion in 
public assets;102 from 1986-2002, over $13 billion worth of provincial 
assets were privatized.103 Writing in 1981, Tupper and Doern argued 
that the commercial focus of crown corporations had increased in 
importance “in recent years.”104 Doern and Phidd also cite the use of 
expenditure cutbacks, deregulation and privatization by the Canadian 
government to achieve a greater focus on profit and commercial compe-
titiveness.105 
AECL was a part of this larger trend. It has not been privatized (though 
every few years the suggestion is floated), but other tools have been used 
to shift its focus to commercial priorities. As early as 1978 AECL oriented 
itself towards greater competitiveness by adopting a “business unit” 
model used by successful US firms in order to create new businesses from 
existing technology.106 The SES project was located within such a 
division, the Local Energy Systems Business Unit. Babin locates the shift 
to “commercialization and promotion” at AECL even earlier, in the mid-
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1960’s.107 AECL also experienced phased budget cuts in the 1980’s, with 
the express purpose of forcing the company to behave in a more 
commercially oriented fashion.108 
The larger project of assessing the extent and impact of neo-liberal 
policies on state owned enterprises is beyond the scope of this article, but 
it seems clear that the South Korean SES sale is a good example of the 
reality of these policies on the ground. The South Korean experience also 
suggests that future attempts to promote next-generation nuclear 
technology (by AECL and others) might benefit from a decreased focus 
on commercial goals. The road to approval for new nuclear designs will 
be long, with conflicting licensing regulations in different countries, and 
the need to secure partnerships and negotiate multiple demands that will 
influence design. The SES represents a straightforward example of the 
innovative costs associated with the choice to let “the market” shape the 
development of next-generation nuclear technology. 
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